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Metaphor and monophony in
the twentieth-century psychology
of emotions
Kenneth J. Gergen
Attempts to define the emotions and elucidate their character have orna-
mented the intellectual landscape for over two thousand years. Two charac-
teristics of this continuing colloquy are particularly noteworthy: first, the
presumption of palpability and, second, the interminability of debate. In the
former case, until the present century there has been little doubting the
obdurate existence of the emotions. In the second book of the Rhetoric,
Aristotle distinguished among 15 emotional states; Aquinas's Summa Theo-
logiae enumerated 6 "affective" and 5 "spirited" emotions; Descartes distin-
guished among 6 primary passions of the soul; the eighteenth-century moral-
ist, David Hartley, located 10 "general passions of human nature"; and the
major contributions by recent theorists, Tomkins (1962) and Izard (1977),
describe some 10 distinctive emotional states. In effect, the cultural history
is one in which there is unflinching agreement regarding the palpable pres-
ence of emotional states within persons.
At the same time, these deep ontological commitments are also matched
by a virtual cacophony of competing views on the character of the emo-
tions - their distinguishing characteristics, origins, manifestations, and sig-
nificance in human affairs. For Aristotle the emotions constituted "motions
of the soul"; for Aquinas the emotions were experienced by the soul, but
were the products of sensory appetites; Descartes isolated specific "pas-
sions of the soul," these owing to movements of the "animal spirits" agitat-
ing the brain. For Thomas Hobbes (1651), the passions were constitutive of
human nature itself, and furnished the activating "spirit" for the intellect,
the will, and moral character. In his Treatise on Human Nature (1739),
David Hume divided the passions into those directly derived from human
instinct (e.g., the desire to punish our enemies) and those which derive from
a "double relation" of sensory impressions and ideas. A century later, both
Spencer's Principles of Psychology and Darwin's The Expression of the
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Emotions in Man and Animals attempted to place the emotions on more
seemingly certain biological grounds.
This interminability of debate is most effectively illustrated by consider-
ing the "objects of study" themselves, that which is identified as an emotion.
For example, Aristotle identified placability, confidence, benevolence,
churlishness, resentment, emulation, longing, and enthusiasm as emotional
states no less transparent than anger or joy. Yet, in their twentieth-century
exegeses, neither Tomkins (1962) nor Izard (1977) recognizes these states
as constituents of the emotional domain. Aquinas believed love, desire,
hope, and courage were all central emotions, and, while Aristotle agreed in
the case of love, all such states go virtually unrecognized in the recent
theories of Tomkins and Izard. Hobbes identified covetousness, luxury,
curiosity, ambition, good naturedness, superstition, and will as emotional
states, none of which qualify as such in contemporary psychology. Tomkins
and Izard agree that surprise is an emotion, a belief that would indeed
puzzle most of their predecessors. However, where Izard believes sadness
and guilt are major emotions, they fail to qualify in Tomkins analysis;
simultaneously, Tomkins sees distress as a central emotion, where Izard
does not.
There is a certain irony inhering in these two features of emotional
debate - palpability and interminability. If the emotions are simply there as
transparent features of human existence, why should univocality be so
difficult to achieve? Broad agreement exists within scientific communities
concerning, for example, chemical tables, genetic constitution, and the
movements of the planets; and where disagreements have developed, proce-
dures have also been located for pressing the nomenclature toward greater
uniformity. Why, then, is scientific convergence so elusive in the case of
emotions? At least one significant reason for the continuous contention
derives from a presumptive fallacy, namely Whitehead's fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness. One suspects that we labor in a tradition in which we
mistakenly treat the putative objects of our mental vocabulary as palpable,
where it is the names themselves that possess more indubitable properties.
Because there are words such as love, anger, and guilt, we presume that
there must be specific states to which they refer. And if there are not, we
presume that continued study of the matter will set the matter straight.
Two thousand years have been insufficient to achieve this end, and one is
ineluctably led to suppose that there are no such isolable conditions inside
individuals to which such terms refer (or at a minimum, the terms are not
determinant markers of such states).
This latter possibility has become far more reasonable within recent
years, and particularly with the development of ordinary language philoso-
phy. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was the major stimulus in
this case, both questioning the referential base for mental predicates and
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offering an alternative way of accounting for such discourse. As Witt-
genstein (1980) asks, "I give notice that I am afraid. - Do I recall my
thoughts of the past half hour in order to do that, or do I let a thought of the
dentist quickly cross my mind in order to see how it affects me; or can I be
uncertain of whether it is really fear of the dentists, and not some other
physical feeling of discomfort?" (p. 32e). The impossibility of answering
such a question in terms of mental referents for emotion terms demands an
alternative means of understanding mental terms. This understanding is
largely to be found in Wittgenstein's arguments for use-derived meaning.
On this view, mental predicates acquire their meaning through various
language games embedded within cultural forms of life. Mental language is
rendered significant not by virtue of its capacity to reveal, mark, or describe
mental states, but from its function in social interchange. The challenge
posed by these ideas to traditional dualistic theories of knowledge was
effectively extended in the works of Ryle (1949) and Austin (1962). Other
scholars, such as Kenny (1963) and Anscombe (1976), went on to explore
the various functions, problems, and philosophical challenges of mental
state terms in their everyday usage.
As the Wittgensteinian view is extended, the possibility of falsifying
scientific propositions about emotional states becomes increasingly prob-
lematic (see Gergen, 1994). This problematization is fortified by a substan-
tial body of writing in both the history of science and the sociology of
knowledge, demonstrating the sociocultural processes at work in rendering
various scientific claims intelligible and acceptable. The important point
for the present offering is that together these various arguments invite
consideration of the reality posits of scientific psychology, independent of
the methods and findings typically employed as justificatory bases within
the field. It is within this context that I wish, then, to sketch with broad
strokes the vicissitudes of emotional discourse in scientific psychology of
the present century. As I shall propose, emotion terms have largely served
political purposes within professional psychology, strategically situating the
discipline (or its various subcultures) in relationship to the academy, to the
general public, and to its own membership. What psychology has had to say
about the emotions, or in many instances failed to say, is not - and in
principle cannot be - the result of careful and controlled observation.
Rather its varying scientific postures can be traced, in large measure, to
the intellectual and cultural circumstances in which professional life is
played out.
Caveats are required: I am not proposing that the present account is
conclusive. This is but a preliminary sketch, and there are many other
influences to which inquiry should also be directed. Nor am I proposing that
all inquiry into the emotions is the result of consciously considered strate-
gies. Rather, I am generating a lens through which coherent sense may be
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derived from an otherwise chaotic morass of particulars. Finally, the pres-
ent analysis is largely confined to developments in mainstream psychology
in the United States. There are other stories to be told about the develop-
ment of psychology in the context of an embattled Europe, and as well in
the many tributaries of American psychology.
Prolegomenon on power/knowledge
Foucault's (1978, 1979) writings on knowledge and power are an effective
entry to the present analysis. Language, for Foucault, serves as a major
medium for carrying out relations. Because language constitutes what we
take to be the world, and rationalizes the form of reality thus created, it also
serves as a socially binding force. By acting within language, relations of
power and privilege are sustained. And, by engaging in the further circula-
tion of a form of language, the array of power relations is further extended.
Thus, as disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, and sociology are
developed, so do they operate as discursive regimes. They specify a world
and a normative domain of relevant action. As these languages are further
elaborated and disseminated, so then is the configuration of power ex-
tended. In this sense, power relations possess a productive capacity. The
relevance of this perspective for psychology has been effectively demon-
strated in Rose's (1985, 1990) analyses of psychological theory and measure-
ment as forms of cultural control.
Yet, there is a strong tendency in Foucault's work to treat discursive
regimes as unitary forms. That is, regimes tend to be treated as internally
coherent and hegemonically accelerated. As Foucault (1979) proposes, be-
ginning in the eighteenth century and extending into the present,
the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce(d) one
another in a circular process. . . . First the hospital, then the school, then, later the
workshop were not simply "reordered" by the disciplines: they became, thanks to
them, apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could be used in them
as an instrument of subjection, and any growth of power could give rise in them to
possible branches of knowledge; it was this link, proper to the technological system
that made possible within the disciplinary element the formation of clinical medi-
cine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology, and the rationalization
of labor. It is . . . a multiplication of the effects of power through the formation and
accumulation of new forms of knowledge, (p. 224)
This line of argument has also been fortified by much Marxist theory,
particularly as inspired by Althusser, of a unified, hegemonic order.
The view I wish to propose, and indeed which might be supported with
alternative quotes from Foucault's capillary view of power, is that life
within what we take to be the existing regimes is seldom unitary. Rather,
regimes themselves are composed of variegated discursive practices, drawn
from sundry contexts, ripped from previous ecologies of usage and stitched
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awkwardly together to form what - with continued usage and considerable
suppression - is seen as a coherent view ("a discipline"). Ontologies and
rationalities are thus only apparently and momentarily univocal; they harbor
multiple tensions and contradictions even for those who dwell within. In a
sense, I wish to augment (or shift the emphasis of) a Foucauldian perspec-
tive with important theses from Bakhtin (1981) and Derrida (1976). While
Bakhtin points to the hybrid or heteroglossial character of any given domain
of language, Derrida's writings emphasize the failure of any language to
carry autonomous meanings - to stand independent of its multiple signifying
traces. The present analysis agrees, then, with Raymond Williams's (1980)
view that "Hegemony is not singular. Its own internal structures are highly
complex, and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and
by the same token . . . they can be continually challenged and in certain
respects modified" (p. 38). The present concern is the history of these
internal movements in psychological science - their challenges, conflicts
and evolutions - from the prebehaviorist period through contemporary
constructionism.
Metaphor and the politics of emotion
The status of psychological study at the turn of the century was a tenuous
one. Scholars both in Europe and the United States were struggling to
achieve recognition for a uniquely psychological science, independent of its
philosophic forbears, and independent of adjoining and already established
sciences (particularly medicine and biology). At the same time, if such a
discipline were to achieve sanction within the academy, its rationale would
have to achieve intelligibility in these very disciplines, as in others. More-
over, such a discipline should ideally enjoy the affirmation of a broader,
educated public. This was particularly so in the United States, with its
strong emphasis on the pragmatic outcomes of scholarly work (Manicas,
1987). In terms of the present analysis, the central challenge for psychology,
then, was to generate forms of self-representation that could simultaneously
appeal to audiences both within the academy and the educated public - in
addition to its own membership.
It is within this context that we may consider the status of emotions
discourse. At the outset, such discourse serves as symbolic capital of high
order. Given the long history of scholarship on the emotions, particularly
within philosophy and later in medicine and biology, there was little
doubting the existence of emotions in human makeup. And, for the fledgling
discipline to claim independent, but allied, investigation into the emotions
would be a potentially powerful self-justificatory device. Similarly, because
of long-standing beliefs in the emotions more generally within the culture, a
discipline that could finally illuminate their character and function would
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purchase promise in providing useful information and services to the so-
ciety.
At the same time, to annex the discourse of emotions was not without its
dangers. Strong claims to probity on matters of the emotion could threaten
the investments of the more established disciplines, thus fostering political
enmity. Further, for psychology to employ the established forms of descrip-
tion and explanation could simultaneously threaten its claims to being a
separate or independent discipline. In addition to these problems, emotions
discourse also served as the mainstay for cultural romanticism. The roman-
ticist rhetoric was becoming increasingly suspect - not only in certain
sectors of philosophy, but within the sciences more generally. For a disci-
pline aspiring to scientific status to grant the emotions a central place in its
vocabulary of explanation could be hazardous. In effect, there were trea-
sures to be gained in appropriating the discourse of the emotions, but the
course could be perilous.
There was extant a rich and compelling vocabulary on which psychologi-
cal investigation could proceed. Of particular importance, Averill (1990)
distinguishes among five major metaphors available to psychological sci-
ence from preceding centuries of dialogue: emotions as (1) inner feelings
(experiences), (2) physiological responses, (3) animal impulses in human
nature, (4) diseases of the mindy and (5) driving forces (vital energy). The
metaphors were also wedded to estimable traditions. First, the nineteenth-
century writings of Bain, Darwin, and Spencer, among others, defined the
emotions as biological processes (drawing from the related metaphors of
emotions as physiological responses, and as animal impulses in human
nature). The biological view was advantageous for a fledgling discipline,
inasmuch as it would ally psychological study with the Naturwissenschaften
as opposed to the new and more tentative breed of the Geisteswissenschaf-
ten. In contrast, there was also a long heritage - drawing from the works of
Descartes, Hartley, and Cabanis - that defined the emotions largely in
terms of internal sensations (the metaphor of inner feelings). It is this
tradition that lent strong support to the efforts of nineteenth-century Ger-
man psychologists to establish psychology as a science sui generis. For
figures such as Fechner, Lehmann, Wundt, and Hamilton, the primary
emphasis was thus placed on the emotions as elements of conscious expe-
rience.
Finally, a third tradition - more allied to the artistic community than to
the biological and philosophical - granted the emotions a preeminent posi-
tion in human makeup. This, the romanticist tradition, treated the emotions
as the fundamental wellsprings for human action. For them these sources
of energy were beyond the penetration by (mere) conscious sensation or
reasoning. This was essentially the tradition of Goethe, Herder, and
Nietzsche, and of Shelley, Keats, and Byron. It was also a tradition of
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special promise to practitioners of psychology, to those who functioned
not in the impersonal conditions of the laboratory, but in the hospital or
consultation room. For this was preeminently a tradition broadly shared
within the culture. To speak this language would be most effective in the
public sphere.
Faced with these options, how should the discipline proceed? In a broad
sense, the choice was between a monophonic and a polyphonic intelligibil-
ity. In the former instance, one could select a single metaphor from the
available array and, within the theoretical and research contexts, extend its
intelligibility to full fruition. There were both advantages and liabilities in
doing so. Each of the existing metaphors offered a major means of rendering
an emotional world intelligible, and the full expansion of its linguistic impli-
cature offered the possibility of a complete, coherent, and rhetorically
powerful theory. Further, an effective monophonic account would either
denigrate the significance of the alternatives, appropriate them, or fully
erase their ontologies. For example, a theory that claims the emotions
fundamentally to be inner feelings, can place physiology in a secondary
position (as mere accompaniment or a reductionist parallel), and can func-
tion unproblematically without reference to impulses, diseases, or driving
forces. Similarly, with the full expansion of the physiological metaphor,
"feelings" become either a secondary manifestation or fully suspect; animal
impulses can be appropriated as physiology at an imprecise level of descrip-
tion, and the metaphor of driving force becomes so much poetry. The
driving-force theorist can reduce feelings and physiology to the status of
manifestations of the driving force, can claim such discourses to be reduc-
tionistic (and largely irrelevant) descriptions, and can claim fully explana-
tory potential without reference to animal impulses.
Yet, the monophonic account is also purchased at a price. For psychol-
ogy to lay claim to either the physiological or biological metaphors would
encroach on neighboring disciplines and disclaim rights to independent
status. The disease metaphor is highly circumscribed, and the driving force
metaphor would ally the field too closely with romanticism. The metaphor
of inner feelings had been particularly appealing in establishing psychology
as an independent discipline in the German context. However, such a
metaphor reduces psychology to the study of conscious states, and thus in
the American context failed to meet the standards of pragmatic utility. If
the field is to appeal to other disciplines without encroaching on their self-
definitions, and if it is to acquire credibility both within and outside the
academy, the more favorable choice would seem to be polyphony. That is,
the most rhetorically powerful discourse should be one that harbors multi-
ple metaphors. Whether this is indeed a winning option is revealed in the
following.
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The early impulse toward polyphony
At the turn of the century, psychology as an academic discipline in the
United States was struggling toward recognition. The American Psychologi-
cal Association was organized in 1892 with 31 members, only a minority of
whom identified themselves professionally as psychologists. If such a field
was to justify itself through its accounts of mental life, how was it to
proceed? From the preceding, there is much to be gained by appropriating
the discourse of emotion; and there is more to be gained in this early stage
by amalgamating metaphors than in monophony. Polyphonic models were
also available for the undertaking. Within the immediately preceding de-
cades, Lotze and Fechner in Germany and Lange in Denmark had at-
tempted to integrate mind and body into a single theory of emotion. For
each, there was an interactive relationship between the mind as sensorium
and determinancy linked physiological processes; for each, psychological
and biological inquiry were interdependent. For American psychology, Wil-
liam James's work was thus of pivotal significance. Not only did his 1890
treatise, The Principles of Psychology, suggest the contours of a unified
discipline - a mutually fortifying synthesis - but his theory of emotion
demonstrated the possibility by integrating two of the root metaphors into a
single formulation. Consider the famous passage:
Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and . . . our feeling
of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says we lose our
fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run. . . . The
hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect. . . .
(Rather) we feel sorry because we cry, afraid because we tremble, (pp. 449-450)
As is clear, the emotions are the by-product of two interacting conditions, a
biological event on the one side, and a pattern of sensations on the other. In
effect, James linked the discourses of physical and sensory reality in such a
way that emotional life could not be understood by a more reductionistic
discipline. Both were required. One could surmise, then, the possibility of a
unified psychology, a discipline requiring its own identity outside biology,
but safely allied with this more established tradition.
But would it be possible to forge a second alliance, this time with the
more pragmatically promising enterprise of clinical treatment? There were
hopes extant even in 1896, with the development of the first psychological
clinic at the University of Pennsylvania, that clinical practitioners could be
integrated into a unified psychology. However, there were at least two
major hurdles to be traversed. First, strongly committed to psychoanalytic
theory, psychiatric practitioners were struggling to gain their own identity
and public sanction. The practitioners in this case were also medical doctors
as opposed to laboratory researchers. In effect, psychologists confronted
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an alterior subculture with its own centripetal force. Both related to and
rationalizing these sociopolitical barriers, were discursive differences - pri-
mary among them the root metaphors for describing the emotions. The
psychiatric view of emotions as life forces and the practices associated with
this metaphor were not easily integrated into the biosensory formulations of
the experimentalist. However, with some hope of integration, Sigmund
Freud was invited in 1908 to speak to an estimable group of American
psychologists. And in 1918 Robert Woodworth's Dynamic Psychology was
published, a volume that attempted to integrate the psychodynamic views
into the experimental account.
Yet, these were indeed uneasy alliances, for each attempt to integrate,
collate, or combine necessarily left significant traces of the root metaphors.
The extended discourse surrounding, substantiating, and constituting the
metaphoric center remained undigested. The result was a continuous ten-
sion: By reverting to monophony, any subculture could brandish Occam's
razor and claim a pure and powerful access to the emotions. Such was the
case as the experimental work of Sherrington (1906) and Cannon (1914)
were used to discredit James and replace his theory with single foundation
in neurophysiology. The senses were, then, epiphenomenal - simply biolog-
ical processes at a gross level of description. Further, the clinically oriented
psychologists found that too much was sacrificed in Dynamic Psychology's
translation of life urges into experimental abstractions. Thus, the journal
Psychological Clinic contemptuously dismissed the volume as "brass instru-
ment psychology," with the instruments "cunningly concealed" from the
public. Finally, the Jamesian emphasis on sensations was difficult to cash
out in terms of broader pragmatic demands. The invitation to polyphony
was insufficient, then, to impede the rapacious discourse of behaviorism.
Behaviorism and the sacrifice of emotion
As broadly recognized, there was a close association between the as-
cendance of behaviorist psychology in the 1930s and the bold moves of
philosophers of science toward foundations for a unified science (Koch,
1963). For academic psychologists in particular, the availability of principles
of scientific rationality were particularly consequential. Still struggling for
recognition and reputation, and unable to forge viable linkages among bio-
logical, human experimental, and practitioner enclaves, the possibility of
modeling itself on a philosophically grounded model of science was an
attractive one. Such a move would allow psychological inquiry to lay claim
to independent scientific status. Because the conception of a unified science
would ensure its connection to the natural sciences, no specific alliance
with biology was essential. And because empiricist foundationalism gave
hope that fundamental principles of human activity could be discovered,
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then any responsible clinical practice would necessarily be derived from the
more basic science. In effect, there was a strong rationale for establishing
psychology as an independent and basic science, from which could be
developed a profusion of practical applications - in the clinic, schools,
industry, the military, and so on. In retrospect, one must suppose that this
family of arguments was a powerful one: Between 1930 and 1960 the ranks
of the American Psychological Association expanded some twentyfold.
Yet, how were the emotions to be regarded by this foundational form of
psychological science? To appreciate the fate of the emotions in this era,
we must further consider the scientific model that psychologists appro-
priated from the philosophy of science. Central components of this received
view were particular conceptions of observation, causality, and methodol-
ogy. That which most clearly aligned the new psychology with the natural
sciences was to be its emphasis on observables. Each of its theoretical
conceptions, insofar as possible, was to be linked through a series of "oper-
ational definitions" to observable behaviors of the organism. In this way the
discipline could replace the interminable and embarrassing imbroglios over
the nature of the "inner world," with facts open to public observation and
reliable replication. And, because overt behavior was clearly material,
where "mindstuff' was dubitable at best, the discipline could claim ultimate
unity with the natural sciences.
The centrality of observation was closely linked to a mechanical view of
causality (Hollis, 1977). If the goal of the science is to predict the behavior
of organisms, and the commitment to observation is preeminent, then the
favored explanatory model is that of Humean causality: behavior as a
consequence of observable antecedents. Teleology and intentionality, as
alternative explanatory forms, are rendered suspect because of their neces-
sary reference to inner (nonobservable) impulses. And, with mechanical
causality as the strong preference for the new science, the optimal research
method is experimentation. It is only in the context of the laboratory experi-
ment, in particular, that the scientist can systematically control the anteced-
ent conditions ("independent variables"), and trace their "causal effects,"
on behavioral outcomes ("dependent variables").
With these commitments in place, the fate of the emotions is virtually
sealed. First, if the chief focus of the science is publicly observable behav-
ior, then mental states and conditions are shunted to the margins of the
discipline, at best "hypothetical," and at worst obfuscating folklore. Be-
cause the emotions are commonly viewed as constituents of the subjective
world (the metaphor of inner sense), their status as "objects of study" is
threatened. And, if they are primarily biological processes, as many argued,
their status in psychological science is equally problematic. The prescribed
forms of study in this case are primarily neurological and biochemical. Nor
were the emotions easily absorbed into a science committed to a conception
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of mechanical causation. Theorists did argue that emotions are "triggered"
by environmental stimuli, but on most traditional accounts the emotions
themselves are inherent or instinctual. For example, if emotions are vital
life forces with the capacity to drive or motivate thought and action, they
function as unmoved movers. They are outside the system of antecedent-
consequent contingency. One might observe their effects in natural settings,
or compare the emotional tendencies of various species, but these are
scarcely inviting topics for laboratory experimentation. In effect, with the
assent of behaviorism the emotions largely vanished from the agenda of
scientific psychology.
For radical behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner (1938), all mental state
terms could properly be eradicated from the discipline. For more liberal
behaviorists, the emotions made but fleeting entry into professional con-
sciousness. For example, in F. H. Allport's volume, Social Psychology
(1924), considered by many to have shaped the next 30 years of social
psychological research, only 15 of the 453 pages are devoted to "feelings
and emotion." Further, the treatment is primarily couched in terms of the
biological metaphor. As to the origin of "feelings," Allport proposes, "The
cranio-sacral division of the autonomic nervous system, supplemented un-
der certain conditions by the cerebro-spinal system, innervates those re-
sponses whose return afferent impulses are associated with the conscious
quality of pleasantness. The sympathetic division produces visceral re-
sponses which are represented in the consciousness as unpleasantness" (p.
90). Much the same view is taken in Myerson's volume, Social Psychology,
published ten years later. No chapter is given over to the emotions in social
life, and the few relevant pages of the volume are built around the view that
"the expression of emotion in the sense of the enormous changes which
take place and become visible as rage, fear, etc. and which come to con-
sciousness as the affect, arise largely through the hypothalamus" (p. 158).
In the highly popular and more cognitively oriented text of the 1950s, Krech
and Crutchfield's Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, there is no
organized treatment of emotion; it is simply a term associated in unsystem-
atic fashion to the concept of motivation.
Neobehaviorism and the return of the interior
The reasons for the softening grasp of radical behaviorism on psychological
science are many and complex. However, as Koch (1963) outlines the case,
psychologists themselves found the demands of a rigorous positivism too
restrictive. Broad debate over the problems inherent in a strict operational-
ism, for example, led to a liberalization of views. Strong cases were made
in favor of a family of "hypothetical constructs," terms that stood in for
possible psychological processes but were not to be confused with the
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processes themselves. The chief function of such terms was to link indepen-
dent and dependent variables in a systematic way. This liberalization of
behaviorism - or the emergence of neobehaviorism - opened a respectable
way for psychology to readmit the psychological interior to the science.
Perhaps the pivotal work for mainstream psychology was that of Clark
Hull and his colleagues at Yale's Institute for Human Relations. Hull's
careful and intellectually commanding work served as a model for psychol-
ogy as science. His quasi-mathematical formulations for a theory of learning
incorporated an increasing number of formal terms for a hypothetical inte-
rior. And, while there was no scientific purpose served by freighting such
terms with cultural content, the possibility of a distinctly psychological
treatment of the emotions was slowly reawakened when Hull articulated a
concept of primary drive in his widely heralded, Principles of Behavior.
Although primarily interested in the organism's acquisition of behavior
patterns, Hull required an explanation for the organism's state of basic
activation. This was accomplished first by borrowing from the biological
metaphor the concept of tissue needs necessary for survival. The choice
of a needs discourse was particularly auspicious, in this case, because
needs, as opposed, for example, to instincts, can be related to environmen-
tal conditions ("hunger needs can be sated"), and the model thus retained
an allegiance to the mechanistic metatheory. At the same time, however,
Hull set out to establish a fully psychological theory. Thus, needs at the
biological level were reinscribed as drives at the psychological level. Pri-
mary drives were thus based on a few simple organismic needs (hunger,
thirst, pain avoidance, etc.), but, once placed into theoretical orbit, oper-
ated with explanatory efficacy without further reference to biological condi-
tions.
While drawing sustenance from the biological metaphor, the conception
of primary drive also carries strong traces of the romanticist metaphor of
vital energy. By successfully exploiting this tradition, psychoanalysts had
successfully ensconced themselves within the medical profession. How-
ever, with the concept of drive now granted scientific respectability, the
door was open not only for scientific psychology to reclaim the discourse of
emotion, but for appropriating psychoanalytic formulations - of demonstra-
ting that the basic tenets of psychoanalytic theory were consistent with the
more scientifically well grounded theories of neobehaviorism. The most
significant attempt of this kind was Dollard and Miller's 1950 volume,
Personality and Psychotherapy. As these authors proposed, by drawing on
the energic wellsprings of the primary drives, new dispositions (secondary
drives) could - under a particular combination of antecedent conditions -
be established. Thus, for example, fear is "an innate response to a (pain)
stimulus" (p. 69). However, if the painful stimulus is associated with a
previously neutral cue, the neutral cue will come to produce fear (now a
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secondary drive). By extending assumptions such as these, psychotherapy
can be properly envisioned as a form of learning laboratory.
With this opening for the development of emotionlike constructs in scien-
tific psychology, the metaphor of emotion as driving force was reinscribed
in dozens of volumes, including Young's Motivation and Emotion, Sy-
monds's Dynamic Psychology, Leeper and Madison's Understanding Per-
sonality, and Cofer's Motivation and Emotion. Such volumes succeeded in
tracing the major Freudian concepts - along with a broad array of common
emotion terms (including love) - to a drive formulation. Yet, the monopho-
nic claim to superiority also stood as a challenge to those invested in
alternative discourses. If the emotions were now legitimate objects of study,
there were other long-standing metaphors to which allegiance could be
claimed. The old battle lines were soon reactivated. In 1964, D. E. Berlyne
was given the opportunity to inscribe the first chapter on emotions ever to
appear in the prestigious Annual Review of Psychology. The title of this
entry into the 15th volume of the series, "Emotional Aspects of Learning,"
seems to leave the behaviorist imprimatur unquestioned. As Berlyne begins,
"Psychologists are, on the whole, following a suggestion reiterated since
1934 by Duffy. She contended that terms like 'emotion' have outlived
their usefulness. We should, she feels, give them up and recognize that all
behavior, including 'emotional' behavior, has both a 'directive' aspect and
an 'energy-mobilization' (or to use newer terms, 'activation' or 'arousal')
aspect, with distinguishable determinants" (p. 115). Berlyne concurs with
this view, but through a series of subtle interpolations, points the way to
replacing the metaphor of driving force with a physiological discourse.
As Berlyne reasons, if emotions are essentially internal drives, and drives
are fundamentally biological, then neurological investigation of brain stimu-
lation constitutes a contribution to our understanding of emotion. By then
reviewing research on the reticular formation, the limbic system, and the
lateral hypothalamus as they "arouse" the organism, the way was again
opened to replace "drive" with physiology. And when physiology becomes
the basis of learning, then psychological theorizing about learning becomes
superfluous. Behaviorist theory is placed in jeopardy; the physiological
metaphor is resuscitated. Further conflict, however, would be postponed
until the cognitive movement reached maturity.
The cognitive revolution: Suppression and suspiration
With interior process once again reinstated, the neobehaviorist program
was slowly eclipsed by a broad and enthusiastic resuscitation of mental
discourse - particularly the discourse of reason. Although there are many
reasons for what became known as the "cognitive revolution" in psychol-
ogy, just as in the case of behaviorism, this investment can be traced in part
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to psychology's dependency on a philosophy of science with its major
roots in the Enlightenment. The twin philosophical movements on which
Enlightenment epistemology largely rests are the empiricist and rationalist.
Empiricist philosophy of science (drawing from Locke, Hume, and the
Mills) gives primary voice to the former (e.g., the preeminent role of obser-
vation), whereas the rationalist tradition (drawing from Descartes, Leibniz,
and Kant) is placed in a secondary but nevertheless essential position (e.g.,
the role of induction and deduction). In many respects, the behaviorist and
neobehaviorist movements in psychology recapitulate at the theoretical
level the empiricist emphasis in the philosophy of science. That is, the
theories of human psychology represent reformulations of the empiricist
metatheory that informs the behaviorist and neobehaviorist projects of sci-
ence (Gergen, 1994). However, these movements simultaneously left unex-
plored the rationalist contribution to the reigning metatheory. Unexplored
was the implicit implicature, in which rational processes could be credited
with a contribution to human action - not simply pawns to antecedent
conditions, but possessing intrinsic properties with their own demands on
action. Thus, the drama of Piaget's (1952) genetic epistemology, Chomsky's
(1958) critique of the Skinnerian theory of language, and his subsequent
advocacy of inherent syntactical knowledge (Chomsky, 1968) was a signifi-
cant demotion in the causal powers attributed to "the stimulus world."
These theories granted active mental operations the central role in directing
human action. The floodgates were now open, and the literature soon
abounded in research and theory on intrinsic cognitive process.
In terms of inquiry into the emotions, however, the initial effect of the
cognitive movement was full-scale suppression. To render the ontology of
"cognition" both intelligible and compelling favored a family of metaphors
that either obscured or failed to recognize a domain of emotions. Although
centrally concerned with the problem of "mental representation," the tradi-
tional epistemological metaphor of "mind as mirror" (Rorty, 1979) was
unserviceable. The metaphor again granted too much credit to the demands
of the stimulus world. Rather, cognitive theorists required fresh meta-
phors - and particularly those which could grasp the imagination of the
scientific community. It is thus that much cognitive theory incorporated, for
example, the metaphor of rationality as statistical process; when operating
optimally, rational thought approximated the principles of statistical analy-
sis (see Gigerenzer and Murray, 1987). Also compelling was a family of
metaphors drawn from engineering (servomechanisms, feedback loops, net-
works) and physics (the hologram). However, perhaps the dominant meta-
phor for the cognitive theorist, and one that adds the strength of allegiance
to the field of artificial intelligence, is the computer (see Hoffman, Cochran,
and Nead's 1990 review). When the internal world is constituted by compu-
tational devices, addresses, locations, data structures, formats, and other
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forms of information processing, the emotions are erased from the ontology
of the interior. Thus, between Berlyn's 1964 entry and 1986, not a single
chapter on the emotions appeared in the Annual Review of Psychology.
Yet, a psychology without emotion would not only fail to draw public
advantage from this symbolic capital but, more locally, would reduce the
dependency of clinical practitioners on "mainstream" science. The major
challenge, then, was to develop a theory that would allow the emotions to
be appropriated by cognitive theory. This was furnished by Stanley
Schachter's (Schachter, 1964; Schachter and Singer, 1962) two-factor the-
ory of emotion. Schachter's formulation carried the traces of both the James
and Hull formulations. Like James, he cleanly separated biology from psy-
chology. At the same time he was able successfully to reframe the sensory
metaphor. Rather than viewing conscious experience as a passive recording
(in this case of the biological interior), the psyche was granted status as an
active interpreter of the world and self. Cognitive process did not so much
reflect as determine the nature of emotional experience. Similar to Hull,
Schachter resorted to an amorphous concept of undifferentiated arousal. In
effect, the biological system furnished energy in the form of generalized
activation, and the cognitive system (rather than sensing messages from
biology as in the case of James) operated in a "top down" manner to define
its character. For Schachter (1964), cognition "exerts a steering function.
. . . It is the cognition which determines whether the state of physiological
arousal will be labeled 'anger,' 'joy,' or whatever" (p. 51).
Not only did Schachter's polyphonic account open up a means for cogni-
tive theorists to annex an important discourse - without threatening the
preferred explanatory fulcrum - but it also promised riches in practical/
therapeutic application. Of particular importance was the conception of
cognitive attribution. Thus, rather than treating actual states of emotion,
motivation, pain, and the like, these states were deontologized, and the
practitioner was invited to focus on attributional tendencies or styles. Under
what conditions did the individual attribute pain, anger, romantic love, and
so on to the self, and how could therapists help the client to reconceptualize
these conditions in more promising ways. (See, e.g., Harvey and Ickes,
1976; Harvey and Weary, 1985.) Perhaps the most articulate application of
the cognitive perspective to psychotherapy is contained in Aaron Beck's
(1976) Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. Published almost 15
years after the initial appearance of Schachter's work, Beck's study alters
the explanatory structure, so that the individual does not cognize undiffer-
entiated arousal (a view that had come under considerable attack) but
cognizes the situation. It is this cognition that has an automatic eliciting
effect on the emotional response. "The thesis that the special meaning of an
event determines the emotional response forms the core of the cognitive
model of emotions and emotional disorder. The meaning is encased in
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cognition" (p. 52). In effect, while a biological propensity is recognized,
cognitive process remains regnant.
In many respects, Schachter's theory did much the same as William
James's at the turn of the century to generate a vision of unification among
psychologists, biologists, and the mental health practitioners - yet, with
psychology firmly at the helm. Also similar to James, this vision was not to
be realized. Schachter's polyphonic account not only brought emotions
into the analytic eye once again but also the residual traces of competing
metaphors. The turn-of-the-century metaphors had scarcely been lost; they
were not only present in the common vernacular, but various professional
enclaves (e.g., comparative psychologists, psychobiologists, ethological
psychologists) had continued to elaborate their potentials outside the main-
stream. These enclaves, were also energized by the cognitivists' penchant
for removing the emotions from the ledger. It was with a sense of righteous
indignation - and possibly an eye toward establishing a unique professional
profile - that the earlier metaphors were once again resuscitated. Leventhal
and Tomarken's (1986) chapter in the Annual Review of Psychology, "Emo-
tion: Today's Problems," is illustrative:
Much of the conflict and confusion in this area stems from an unwillingness to grant
independent conceptual status to emotion. This "begrudging" attitude has three
components: (a) the behavioristic legacy and its suspicion of subjective concepts;
(b) the traditional cognitive hold on our thinking in which emotion is a combination
of arousal and cognition . . . ; and (c) the reluctance of cognitively oriented scien-
tists to view an emotion as anything more complex than a "stop" or interrupt rule in
the simulation of mental operations. . . . Admitting a richer concept of emotion to
the lexicon could generate major upheavals in cognitive theory as emotions theory
addresses the growing theoretical and empirical knowledge in neuroscience and
molecular biology, (p. 566)
With this concluding sentence, the biological metaphor again springs to
life. Support is garnered in this case from a variety of studies in brain
lateralization. Research is used to argue that the right cortical hemisphere
plays a major role in the control and expression of moods, and the recogni-
tion of emotion in others. The left hemisphere is said to be "nonemotional"
(Tucker, 1981). It was noted earlier that the biological metaphor could be
segmented, the one viewing emotions as physiological events and the other
as animal behavior. Armed with the second metaphor, another phalanx of
investigators attempted to identify emotions as intrinsic patterns of organis-
mic expression. Perhaps the most widely heralded of these endeavors are
those of Paul Ekman and his colleagues, who - following in Darwin's
footsteps - amassed data to prove that the expression of "the basic" emo-
tions in human beings is universal (Ekman, 1982). These efforts were also
supported by animal behavior specialists who argued for the evolutionary
benefits derived from various emotional expressions (cf. Eibel-Eibelsfeldt,
1979; Plutchick, 1980). The two biological metaphors are finally collapsed -
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or at least, a harmony is sought - in the Blanchard and Blanchard's contri-
bution to the 1988 volume of the Annual Review of Psychology.
The drive energy metaphor has also reappeared in full regalia. This is
unabashedly so in the therapeutic community, where popular-selling vol-
umes on the primal scream, cocounseling, and 12-step programs celebrate
the elemental force of the emotions. More subtly, the metaphor has resur-
faced in a number of scholarly treatises attempting not so much to replace
the cognitive and the biological views, as to perform interpolations in which
motivational forces are given a primary role. For example, in the broad
overview of Frijda (1986), the emotions are treated as forms of action
potential (with traces of unleashed drives). "The emotions," he writes, "can
be defined as modes of relational action readiness, either in the form of
tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environ-
ment or in the form of modes of relational readiness as such" (p. 71).
Similarly, in his elaborate integration of the literature, Lazarus (1991) not
only stresses the concept of emotion as motivation (drawing from the
seventeenth-century concept of the passions), but posits a vast array of
innate "action tendencies" that determine the course of anger, envy, love,
sadness and so on.
Thus, in spite of the generalized hegemony of the cognitive movement,
we find that as emotion has returned full force as a discursive object, the
profession is once again fragmented. The fault lines are precisely those
of the century's beginning. Differing camps construct research programs,
generate literatures, hold conferences, and generally organize themselves
around contrasting tropes. Illustrative of this climate of contestation is
George Mandler's (1984) troubled query,
Is there a cohesive psychology of emotion? . . . It may be symptomatic that the best
summary was provided by Madison Bentley. He knew in 1928 what too many
psychologists still fail to accept today, that there is no commonly, even superficially,
acceptable definition of what a psychology of emotion is about. . . . Bentley con-
cludes: "Whether the term (emotion) stands for a psychological entity upon which
we are all researching I do not know. Whether it is the common subject of our
varied investigations I am not sure enough to be dogmatic." (p. 16)
Social constructionism and the metaphoric inflection
Thus far we find that as various movements in psychology have gained
ascendance - within the discipline, within the academy more generally, or
within the broader cultural and economic context of mental health prac-
tice - emotional discourse has been shaped or suppressed accordingly. The
different metaphors of the emotions have variously served to justify, credit,
excoriate, build allegiances, sustain effective relations, and secure employ-
ment for a broad array of disciplinary subcultures. Abundant traces of
earlier contests remain, as discursive regimes wax and wane in strength.
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However, the story does not thereby terminate. There is yet a final chapter
to be added, one that dramatically alters the rhetorical landscape. We
confront now the possible emergence of a new form of monophony.
For early behaviorists, the absence of research on emotions seemed
largely derived from a commitment to a logical empiricist metatheory. How-
ever, since the 1950s logical empiricist philosophy has become subject to
increasing criticism, and since the 1960s there has been a general erosion of
interest in projects designed to establish rational foundations of scientific
method. Moving from the more conservative critiques, for example, of
Popper and Quine, to the more radical incursions of theorists such as Kuhn
and Feyerabend, philosophy has entered what most consider a "postempiri-
cist" phase. This erosion of confidence in the philosophical justification for
scientific psychology has also invited a broad-scale critique of the science
and fostered lively discussion of a "new psychology."1
As many now recognize, perhaps the chief contender for a successor
project to logical empiricism is some form of social constructionism. Draw-
ing importantly from emerging developments most prominently in the his-
tory of science, the sociology of knowledge, ethnomethodology, rhetorical
studies of science, symbolic anthropology, feminist theory, and poststruct-
uralist literary theory, social constructionism is not so much a foundational
theory of knowledge as an antifoundational dialogue. Primary emphases of
this dialogue are placed on the social-discursive matrix from which knowl-
edge claims emerge and from which their justification is derived; the values/
ideology implicit within knowledge posits; the modes of informal and insti-
tutional life sustained and replenished by ontological and epistemological
commitments; and the distribution of power and privilege favored by disci-
plinary beliefs. Much attention is also given to the creation and transforma-
tion of cultural constructions; the adjudication of competing belief/value
systems; and the generation of new modes of pedagogy, scholarly expres-
sion, and disciplinary relations.
Given these investments - in loosening the grip of the empiricist world
view, and building toward a positive alternative - what posture can con-
structionist psychologists take toward the emotions? In this instance none
of the central metaphors of the preceding century are felicitous. The biologi-
cal, the sensory (and its cognitive derivative), and the energic metaphors
each conflict with the assumptions of constructionist metatheory. The ear-
lier metaphors, instantiated at the theoretical level, blunt the impetus to-
ward change at the level of metatheory. To enumerate the most prominent
failings: (1) Each of the traditional metaphors essentializes the emotions -
treating them as biological, sensory-cognitive, or energic givens - there in
nature, to be interrogated by science. In effect, the metaphors portend the
existence of an obdurate domain outside the realm of social construction.
(2) Each metaphor derives from and rationalizes a dualistic conception of
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human functioning. Not only is dualism a primary constituent of the empiri-
cist view of knowledge (with the mental representations of individuals serv-
ing as the locus of knowledge), but favors psychological explanations of
human action as opposed to the microsocial explanations central to con-
structionism. (3) In their focus on individual process, each of the metaphors
favors an ideology of the self-contained individual, a commitment that most
constructionists see as inimical to cultural well-being. Feminist critics have
been particularly vocal in their critiques of the biological metaphor, and its
contribution to the cluster of androcentric binaries that valorize reason,
culture, and masculinity, at the expense of emotion, nature, and femininity.
Confronted with the unattractive options offered by the tradition, and
desirous of appropriating this significant discursive realm, it has been neces-
sary for constructionists to draw from alternative repositories of cultural
intelligibility. The result is a resuscitation of a family of interrelated but
(until now) more marginal metaphors within the culture. Primary among
these are life as theater (the dramaturgic), as game (the ludic), as literature
(the narrative), and as cultural ritual (the tribal). These metaphors not only
furnish the constructionist with a novel and intelligible set of alternatives to
the discourses favored by empiricist psychology, but simultaneously func-
tion to reinforce the social constructionist alternative to empiricist meta-
theory. The metaphors thus carry a dual function, serving as explanatory
vehicles in scholarly research on the emotions, and as rhetorical supports
for the overarching attempts at metatheoretical ascendance.
To elaborate, each of the new metaphors first draws attention away from
individual, psychological process, and gives primacy to the social sphere:
to the play (see, e.g., Sarbin, 1986; Averill, 1982), the game (Bailey, 1983),
the text (Gergen and Gergen, 1988), or the tribal ritual (Rosaldo, 1980;
White and Kirkpatrick, 1985). In effect, psychological explanations are
replaced by processes of cultural meaning-making. Second, the kind of
essentialism posited by the empiricists is placed in critical relief, as each of
the metaphors views the emotions as socially constituted - with emotional
action paralleling, for example, the performance of Hamlet (the dramatur-
gic), or hitting a "home run" in baseball (the ludic); to achieve an emotion is
thus similar to writing a climax to a short story (the narrative), or participat-
ing in a rite de passage (the tribal). There simply is no reality of emotion
independent of the community of interlocutors.
Further, each of these metaphors operates against the empiricist claims
of universality - casting aspersions on formulations of human functioning
that discount history and culture. Rather, each invites sensitivity to the
sociocultural circumstances giving rise to various forms of emotional perfor-
mance. Constructionist scholarship thus lays special emphasis on the spe-
cific cultural functions played by various emotional expressions (see, e.g.,
Lutz, 1988), and the historical conditions giving rise to various forms of
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emotion (Badinter, 1980; Stearns, 1989). Finally, each of these metaphors
opens the way to social critique. The empiricist family of metaphors was all
consistent with a world of Humean causality; individual behavior is simply
a causal byproduct of antecedent conditions (physiology, stimuli, human
constitution). Persons themselves have no responsibility for their actions.
For constructionists, such a view of human action not only favors the status
quo ("people simply do what they must do"), but leads to myopic claims of
ethical neutrality. Yet, the alternative metaphors of the stage, the game, the
text, and the tribe all emphasize the optional nature of the actions in
question. Contemporary patterns of action are scarcely required, and they
could be otherwise (see, e.g., Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1990). Further, it is
one of the responsibilities of the scholar to challenge problematic patterns
of action, to engage in forms of social critique.
Conclusion
The view of a unitary hegemonic discourse, subtly expanding and subvert-
ing alternative intelligibilities, scarcely fits the history of American psychol-
ogy. Rather, we find a discipline that is at once attempting to legitimate
itself with respect to differing audiences (the academic and the general
populace in particular), and fraught with internecine warfare concerning the
image of science. Further, these investments are significantly manifest in
the theoretical content of the field. As emphasized here, the view taken of
"the emotions" is scarcely neutral - derived from a preexistent observation
base - but plays an important role in the varying attempts at professional
ascendance. The metaphoric construction of the emotions thus serves to
buttress or reinforce claims to legitimacy. In certain cases, claims to supe-
rior position have lent themselves to theories that exclude or marginalize
emotions discourse. However, because "the emotions" are integral to the
culturally sedimented belief systems, exclusionary projects are limited in
life-span. They are vulnerable to competing movements that, by reinstating
the emotions, gain important cultural advantage. There is, then, substantial
institutional power derived from compelling metaphors of the emotions.
While various movements in psychology have attempted to eradicate the
emotions, the resilience and resurgence of the discourse reveals the over-
arching significance of the broader context of meaning.
Further, when emotions discourse has played a central role in justifying
the scientific project, it has confronted an obfuscating polyphony. A variety
of compelling metaphors has been available for elaboration. However, at-
tempts at a polyphonic blending have not sutured the conflicting figurations.
And, with variegated metaphors still creditable, the temptation toward
monophonic reductionism remains ever salient. The move toward a social
constructionist science significantly alters the political complex. Construe-
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tionists abandon each of the traditional metaphors - and thus both the
long-standing tendencies toward polyphony and monophony. Rather, the
constructionist relies on a family of textually related metaphors that blur
the distinction between polyphony and monophony. And, while these meta-
phors are not likely to carry rhetorical weight within the natural science
domain, they are highly congenial with the shift toward a human (as op-
posed to a behavioral) science more generally within the academy. We thus
confront a new array of tensions, the results of which are certain to ramify
throughout forthcoming disquisitions on emotion.
Note
1 See, for example, Armistead (1974), Harre and Secord (1972), and Gergen (1994a).
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